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Legality, race, and inequality: 
An interview with Ruth Gomberg-Muñoz 
(Savage Minds) 
 
Link: http://savageminds.org/2015/01/28/legality-race-and-inequality-an-interview-
ruth-gomberg-munoz-part-i/ 
Ruth Gomberg-Muñoz is an assistant professor of anthropology at Loyola University 
Chicago. Her 2011 book, Labor and Legality, explores the work and social lives of 
undocumented busboys in Chicago. Since 2011, Gomberg-Muñoz has been conducting 
ethnographic research with mixed status couples as they go through the process of 
legalization; a book manuscript based on that research is in the works. 
Ryan Anderson: For decades many of the debates about immigration in the US focus 
on legality. Politicians and pundits often speak in terms of following — and breaking —
 the law. But in your work you talk about the “illegalization” of migrant workers. What 
do you mean by this? 
Ruth Gomberg-Muñoz: Migration is only “illegal” when laws prevent mobility. 
Historically, U.S. immigration policies have encouraged migration of workers deemed 
essential to the U.S. economy, a long-standing practice of labor importation punctuated 
by deportation and restrictionist campaigns in times of economic downturn. For 
example, Mexican migrant workers were imported to the United States by the millions 
in the mid-20th century to help fill labor shortages brought about by World War II and 
an expanding U.S. economy. Laws were created, negotiated, and adjusted to allow U.S. 
employers access to these workers; a contract worker program was instituted, and 
Mexicans and other Latin Americans were exempted from the quotas that limited 
immigration from elsewhere in the world at the time. 
In the 1960s, the laws changed. An explicitly race-based U.S. immigration system was 
altered to prioritize family reunification, and Mexican workers became subject to 
numerical restriction for the first time ever. Over the next four decades, widespread 
demand for Mexican migrant labor persisted, while free trade policies undermined the 
ability of millions of Mexican farmers and workers to make a living in Mexico. Not 
surprisingly, numerical restrictions did not ultimately curb the migration of Mexicans to 
the U.S., but they did make it far more difficult for Mexicans and other Latin Americans 
to migrate legally. In this context, barriers to lawful immigration have produced 
unauthorized migration by “illegalizing” long-standing patterns of migration at a time 
when workers needed them most.  
Politicians and pundits who attribute unauthorized migration to migrants’ “law-
breaking” alone disconnect migration decisions from the complex social, economic, and 
political processes in which those decisions take place. This reduction is not merely 
overly simplistic, it also distorts the relations of power that shape a person’s status in 
society, renders law invisible and unassailable, and legitimizes inequality by dismissing 
“lawbreakers’” claims to resources and rights. 
An attention to processes that “illegalize” migration, as Nicholas De Genova (2002, 
2005) argues, illuminates the role of immigration policy in creating both legality and 
illegality. Rather than assuming “the law” as a given, then, we can explore policy-making 
as a dynamic cultural process that is deeply embedded in broader sociopolitical and 
economic contexts. 
RA: At the end of your book Labor and Legality, you explain that undocumented labor 
isn’t sought after because it’s cheap, but instead because of its “inherent powerlessness”. 
What does this tell us about the realities of immigration here in the US? Why isn’t this 
issue of powerlessness a more dominant theme in the ongoing national immigration 
debate? 
RGM: The undocumented busboys who I profile in Labor and Legality are not 
particularly low-paid relative to other working-class men in the neighborhood, a fact 
that intrigued me when I did the research. They are also not unique in this respect: A 
2002 study by the Center for Urban Economic Development at the University of Illinois 
at Chicago (UIC) found that, while undocumented workers in Chicago earn less than 
their documented counterparts, most earn above the minimum wage and some even 
earn middle-class incomes. This appears to contradict the truism that employers favor 
undocumented workers for certain jobs because they can pay them less than lawful 
residents or U.S. citizens, and it begs the question: why do employers hire, and even 
prefer, undocumented workers when there are U.S. citizens who will do the work? 
The short answer is that the price of labor is not determined by wages alone. 
Undocumented workers are more likely than documented workers to be victims of wage 
theft, denied workman’s compensation claims, and to work in jobs that are seasonal, 
socially degraded, or otherwise insecure. Lack of documents truncates their 
occupational mobility, while ineligibility for programs like FAFSA, unemployment 
benefits, welfare assistance, Medicare, and social security makes them especially 
dependent upon work. Together, these constraints combine to funnel and keep 
undocumented people in jobs that U.S. citizens are likely to refuse if they have better 
options. Of course, most U.S. citizens do not have unfettered access to resources or 
opportunities, and probationers, parolees, welfare-to-work program participants, guest 
workers, and lawful immigrants, among others, share some of the vulnerabilities that 
plague undocumented workers. 
Not coincidentally, wages and workplace protections increase for undocumented 
workers who are members of labor unions. This is an important point, because 
undocumented workers are often portrayed as “unorganizable,” or powerless to the 
point that they are either unable or unwilling to join workers’ collectives. This portrayal 
is belied by the participation of undocumented workers in labor struggles in Chicago, 
L.A., and elsewhere. Indeed, if I were writing Labor and Legality today, I would not 
describe undocumented workers as “powerless,” but rather “disempowered,” an 
important distinction that leaves room for the capacity of people, documented and not, 
to influence the conditions under which they live and work. 
Ryan Anderson: Earlier you made reference to the historically race-based nature of 
the U.S. immigration system. Race is an issue that many tend to avoid here in the U.S. —
 and this is definitely the case when it comes to immigration. Immigration debates often 
focus on crime, economics, competition over jobs, pressure on social services, taxes, 
and, of course, upholding the rule of law. It’s almost as if many people bend over 
backwards to deny that race has anything to do with our current policies. What’s this 
avoidance and denial all about? 
Ruth Gomberg-Muñoz: I think that many people are unaware of the central role that 
race has played in shaping the U.S. immigration system. For example, the very first 
major citizenship policy in the U.S. limited citizenship to “free white men of good moral 
character,” while the first immigration policy, 1882’s Chinese Exclusion Act, prohibited 
immigration of Chinese nationals. The first comprehensive immigration bill, passed in 
1924, was designed to curb immigration of “filthy” and “unassimilable” Southern and 
Eastern Europeans, and Asians were deemed ineligible for lawful immigration and U.S. 
citizenship until 1952. It was not until the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 that 
overt racial biases in U.S. immigration policy were eliminated.  
After the 1965 Act, explicit mention of race has all but disappeared from immigration 
policy debates, and “illegal immigration” has become the chief target of punitive policy. 
As with previous periods, this targeting is conceptually and administratively tied to 
concerns about criminality, lack of assimilation, and “retaining” America’s heritage, but 
now these map onto an immigration classification, “illegal alien,” that is ostensibly 
divorced from ethnoracial associations. 
There are two questions raised by this shift: 1. Are current U.S. immigration policies and 
practices actually race-neutral? 2. Is immigration status a better basis for discrimination 
and exclusion than race? 
As to the first question, as Golash Boza and Hondagneu Sotelo (2013) show, U.S. 
immigration enforcement is permeated with racial, class, and gendered bias that 
especially targets Latino men. While immigrants from Latin America make up about 75 
percent of the total undocumented population, they have accounted for over 90 percent 
of deportees since 2000. This disparity is partly due to the concentration of immigration 
enforcement on the U.S.-Mexico border, and partly due to racial profiling of Latinos by 
local police who cooperate with immigration agencies; in fact, in 2011, 93 percent of 
people deported via local/federal cooperation were Latino. And the overwhelming 
majority of deportees are men. 
But racialized enforcement is not the work of rogue officers alone — U.S. policies target 
and criminalize undocumented people differently. For example, unlawful presence in 
the United States is a civil violation, and undocumented people who enter the U.S. with 
a temporary visa and overstay it have not committed any federal crime. But 
unauthorized entry and reentry are aggressively prosecuted as federal crimes. A 2014 
Pew Hispanic Center study found that unlawful reentry, which is a felony, made up 26 
percent of all federally sentenced cases in 2012. Nearly all of these migrants are 
sentenced to jail time — in 2012, prison sentences for unlawful reentry averaged 23 
months prior to deportation. Further, three-quarters of prosecutions for unlawful 
reentry occurred in just five districts — all of which share a border with Mexico. The 
criminalization of unauthorized reentry and the concentration of criminal prosecutions 
on the U.S.-Mexico border overwhelmingly ensnare Latin American migrants, and the 
share of Latinos among federally sentenced offenders rose from 23 percent in 1992 to 48 
percent in 2012. 
Together, this (and other) evidence shows that “illegal” is not “illegal” in the same way 
for everyone. Instead, undocumented Latinos are more likely than other undocumented 
people to be targeted by U.S. immigration enforcement measures and subjected to 
incarceration, detention, and deportation. 
The second question — Is immigration status a better basis for discrimination and 
exclusion than race? — is more complex. Certainly, many scholars and activists have 
challenged the idea that non-citizens should be denied rights, advocating for non-state 
or human rights-based approaches to citizenship. I would just add that, like racial 
categories, immigration categories are cultural inventions that have been (as racial 
categories were) codified in law. But legal codification does not make a practice morally 
legitimate, much less socially just. U.S. policies violate national borders and state 
sovereignty all the time, so why should migrants be punished for doing it? 
I recently read a book foreword in which the author asserted that, “There can be no 
question about the right of every country to determine who is admitted, when, and how. 
This is the law, whose present necessity no one could reasonably dispute.” I completely 
disagree. I believe our responsibility is exactly that: to question how rights, borders, and 
laws are established and controlled and why nationalist tropes of security and freedom 
sanction some “unauthorized” border crossings and criminalize others. 
RA: Speaking of the laws and policies that shape border crossings, what's your take on 
Obama’s recent executive order on immigration? 
RGM: On November 20th 2014, Obama announced that his administration would 
implement a program called Deferred Action for Parental Accountability, or DAPA, to 
shield certain undocumented people from deportation. In a nutshell, undocumented 
parents of U.S. citizen and lawfully resident children will be eligible for a 3-year work 
permit and deferral of deportation as long as they have no “serious” criminal record and 
can prove that they have not left the United States since January 1, 2010. 
Like most people I know, I have mixed feelings about the executive order. On the one 
hand, DAPA will provide much-needed relief from deportation for millions of people 
and their family members. Further, those who are eligible will be able to work legally 
and qualify for tax credits. These are real and meaningful benefits. 
On the other hand, DAPA is severely limited in scope, scale, and duration. The majority 
of undocumented people in the U.S. — some 6 to 7 million — will not qualify for DAPA. 
Among them are people who are childless (including many LGBTQ people), parents 
whose children are also undocumented or DACA-eligible, anyone with a “serious” 
criminal record (likely including convictions for unlawful reentry), and anyone who 
cannot prove continuous residence since 2010. This last criterion is especially onerous 
for cyclical migrants and people who work in the informal economy (such as off-the-
books domestic work) and may especially burden immigrant women. 
The benefits provided by the program, its scale, are also limited. DAPA eligibility does 
not guarantee protection from deportation, but rather a promise to use prosecutorial 
discretion in a deportation case — a big difference. And even with work eligibility, 
program participants will not qualify for most public benefits, including health care 
under the Affordable Care Act, SSI, Medicaid (except for emergency care), TANF, or 
SNAP, though workers pay into those programs with their tax dollars. Finally, DAPA is 
neither lawful permanent residency nor a path to lawful permanent residency  — it is 
merely a promise not to pursue deportation at this time. The economic and political 
vulnerabilities of DAPA participants may be reduced, but they will persist. 
Finally, the duration of the program is limited — eligibility is only good for 3 years. At the 
end of that period, participants may be able to reapply if the program is still available; 
but executive action is not legislation, and it can be ended at any time. In the meantime, 
program participants will be subject to routine and prolonged state surveillance — kind 
of like parole. Those who remain eligible will be held in a state of permanent legal 
precarity, or, as Cecilia Menjívar puts it, liminal legality, which confers on them some 
legal recognition without any long-term security. 
RA: And so, while Obama’s latest action does have some positive aspects, the 
underlying problems persist, right?  This seems to be a long-running theme in US 
immigration policy: we end up with one partial solution after another, but the 
underlying problems are still there.  Meanwhile, we have all of these migrants stuck in 
various liminal states—whether legal, social, political, or cultural.  Sometimes this 
means prison.  Sometimes it means they live the “shadowed lives” that Leo Chavez 
detailed years ago.  Often it means many of these people live in incredibly marginalized 
conditions.  Every election cycle, politicians on both sides often talk about the need to 
“fix” the immigration system, but that never seems to happen.  It’s almost as if it’s this 
massive, unsolvable problem.  What’s your take on this?  Why are these problems with 
immigration so persistent?  And, coming from this as an anthropologist—as opposed to 
an economist or political scientist—what can be done to move things forward? 
RGM: The first thing to note is that immigration is not a “problem” for everyone. In 
fact, many people benefit not only from migration but also from the massive 
enforcement apparatus that has been built up around it. Employers benefit from having 
a disempowered work force; U.S. consumers benefit from low prices on food, goods, and 
services made possible by underpaid migrant labor; the U.S. government benefits from 
billions of tax dollars that flow into Social Security and Medicaid coffers that are paid, 
but cannot be claimed, by non-legal workers; enforcement agencies, government 
contractors, and prison private corporations benefit from massive expenditures on 
detention, militarization, and enforcement; finally, politicians on both sides of the 
political “aisle” benefit from fanning the flames of immigration passions to win votes 
from constituents, as well as from campaign donations made by the companies that 
profit from immigrant detention. In fact, the private corporations that hold immigration 
contracts spend tens of millions of dollars on political lobbying and have been major 
campaign contributors to immigration hard-liners. In return, congress has mandated 
that 34,000 people be kept in immigrant detention, including children, every day.  
In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that political winds seem to blow in favor of 
stagnation on immigration reform or toward policies that only reproduce the flaws of a 
“broken” system. But it is not clear to me that immigration policies alone are actually 
capable of preventing unauthorized migration, even if politicians were inclined to try. 
The build-up of bigger, badder national borders will never stem migration; only 
addressing the global inequalities that foster mass migrations in the first place can do 
that.  
Anthropologists are working everyday with immigrant communities to push back 
against the enforcement juggernaut. I could never do justice to the scope of that work 
here, but anthropologists help craft policy, offer legal counsel and moral support to 
detained and deported immigrants, do advocacy work with community organizations, 
and provide nuanced and complex analyses of migration in our classrooms. 
Anthropology is especially well suited to help students develop a contextualized and 
“long view” analysis of migration and the forces that shape and define it in specific ways. 
This is a significant endeavor given the broader dehumanizing and decontextualized 
rhetoric that tends to accompany immigration discourse in the United States.   
RA: Your latest research follows mixed status couples as they attempt to move through 
the process of legalization.  What does the process of legalization look like from an 
ethnographic vantage point?  Where is your most recent work leading you? 
RGM: In the beginning, I envisioned my latest project as a sort of sequel to Labor and 
Legality that would explore what happened to undocumented workers when they 
became “legal.” Would constraints on workers’ upward mobility be largely removed, as 
many workers in Labor and Legality believe, or would workers continue to face 
restricted opportunities and limited financial security as newly legal immigrants? That 
is, I was mostly interested in the degree to which legalization transforms workers’ lives. I 
did not anticipate that the journey would be a story unto itself. 
The first thing I learned is that almost none of the undocumented people who I know 
can change their immigration status—even those who have lived in the U.S. for many 
years and have U.S. citizen relatives. I ended up focusing on mixed status couples 
because marriage to a U.S. citizen is one of the few relationships that can put some 
undocumented people on a path to legal status. But even eligible spouses of U.S. citizens 
face a gauntlet of onerous criteria, complicated forms, expensive fees, and, in some 
cases, indefinite separation to reach—if their luck holds—lawful permanent residency at 
the end. Only half of the couples who I profiled made it to lawful residency by the end of 
my 3-year field season. The others live separately or have relocated together outside of 
the United States. 
I also found that the process of legalization largely diverges according to mode of entry 
into the United States. Undocumented visa-overstayers with U.S. citizen spouses can 
typically change their status at an immigration office within the United States. People 
who enter unlawfully, on the other hand, must leave the U.S. to be processed at a U.S. 
consulate in their country of origin. All but a few trigger a 10-year bar on their return. 
Because undocumented Latinos are more likely to be border-crossers than 
undocumented people from elsewhere, they are also more likely to face these higher 
hurdles to legalization. 
Not only does this process require families that are already together to split apart, it also 
places U.S. citizens at the center of immigration petitions. This is because the 10-year 
bar can only be waived if the U.S. citizen would suffer “extreme hardship” in the event of 
a ten-year separation from his or her spouse. The pain and loss of family separation is 
considered regular hardship, not extreme, and U.S. citizens must be able to articulate 
their suffering in mostly medical and/or financial terms. In the process, they learn that 
their citizenship offers little protection from stigmatization, bureaucratic indifference, 
and vulnerability to prolonged family separation. Thus, immigration policies 
simultaneously uphold the value of U.S. citizenship and degrade U.S. citizens—a 
contradiction, I argue, that inevitably results when legal exclusion and lived inclusion 
collide.  
I am writing about this process now; ongoing data analysis and writing will likely keep 
me busy for a few more years. In the meantime, I will be working with a legal clinic to 
process DAPA applications and using that time to think about the implications of this 
expanded tier of temporary status for the organization of inequality in the United States. 
 
